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I. INTRODUCTION
After one has taught law for many years, one tends to
become convinced that real property law is really a course quite
different from that taught by those who are teaching contracts
or torts. This, of course, is a serious misconception, reinforced
periodically by the publishers of casebooks who scrupulously
observe the rigorous distinctions in their product packaging.
One can begin the trip back to reality by noting one of Pros-
ser's considerable contributions to our understanding of the law:
"Such is the unity of all history that anyone who endeavors to
tell a piece of it must feel that his first sentence tears a seam-
less web." So said Maitland, speaking of the law, and his words
have become trite with much repetition. Nevertheless, our law
schools and our writers of texts continue to tear the web into
courses and fields and compartments, which have in them-
selves no virtue other than mere convenience in organization,
but tend to give the entirely misleading impression that east is
east and west is west, and never the twain shall meet. Actually
there are, of course, no such distinctly segregated compart-
ments in the law. Everywhere the fields of liability and doc-
trine interlock; everywhere there are borderlands and penum-
bras, and cases which cut across the arbitrary lines of division,
or straddle them in a manner utterly bewildering to the young
lawyer whose education has led him to look for sharp division.'
One of the most outstanding jurists of our time, Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, articulated a principle spanning the "seam-
less web" of the law which, unfortunately, has been obscured by
the attempts of courts, casebook writers, and law professors to
pigeonhole the principle into familiar categories. Justice Cardozo
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1981); MODERN REAL ESTATE DOCUMENTATION (1975).
1. W. PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF ToRTs 380 (1954).
259
260 University of Puget Sound Law Review
established the principle that a person who undertakes a task is
liable for injury to remote third parties, regardless of lack of
privity, which arises from the person's negligent performance of
the task. Cardozo also enunciated an exception to this rule
which developed into a widely accepted opposing rule. This arti-
cle will first trace the origin of Cardozo's principle and the
opposing rule. Next, it will examine the attempts by courts and
casebook writers to categorize those cases which are properly
governed by Cardozo's principle under various familiar legal cat-
egories. This article will next conclude that these attempted
classifications are erroneous and obscure the applicability of the
principle in numerous areas of the law, and that arguments
against applying the principle are unpersuasive. Finally, this
article will demonstrate how Cardozo's principle has been
applied in cases directly or indirectly within the real property
law category and conclude that courts should continue to recog-
nize and extend application of the principle to all areas of the
law.
II. THE CARDOzO DECISIONS
The Cardozo decisions that will be discussed under this
heading were handed down before the multimillion dollar tort
verdict became commonplace. Today, particularly in the air-
plane accident cases, the verdicts are enormous.2 Cardozo was
careful to frame his decisions so that the verdicts would not be
excessive; his concepts of liability at times reveal this pinch-
penny approach. Given this approach, it is somewhat surprising
that he extended the limits of liability as far as he did.
A. Glanzer v. Shepard
Glanzer v. Shepard' is one of the early Cardozo decisions
resting basically on the authority of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co." A weigher hired by the seller of beans was held liable to the
buyer for negligence in the weighing of the beans, although priv-
ity was obviously lacking between the buyer and the weigher.
2. Modern tort lawyers reversed the trend in damage awards when they pointed out
that insurance companies craftily appealed small verdicts (which became reported cases)
and settled those involving serious disability or death. Belli, The Adequate Award, 39
CALIF. L. REv. 1, passim (1951).
3. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
4. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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The rule that one who undertakes to perform a task is liable for
his negligence came as no surprise. The importance of the case
lies in its ruling that the party performing the task is liable to a
person who did not hire him.' Cardozo, writing for the court,
observed that all that was needed was to determine whether a
duty existed on the part of the weigher to the buyer. The court
found that such a duty was present. And the court deliberately
chose not to place that duty within the confines of contract law.
The court said:
We state the defendants' obligation, therefore, in terms, not of
contract merely, but of duty. Other forms of statement are pos-
sible. They involve, at most, a change of emphasis. We may see
here, if we please, a phase or an extension of the rule in Law-
rence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 . . . . If we fix our gaze upon that
aspect, we shall stress the element of contract, and treat the
defendants' promise as embracing the rendition of a service,
which, though ordered and paid for by one, was either wholly
or in part for the benefit of another. . . . These ... methods
of approach arrive at the same goal, though the paths may
seem at times to be artificial or circuitous. We have preferred
to reach the goal more simply. The defendants, acting, not cas-
ually nor as mere servants, but in the pursuit of an indepen-
dent calling weighed and certified at the order of one with the
very end and aim of shaping the conduct of another. Diligence
was owing, not only to him who owed, but to him also who
relied.6
Cardozo, however, reached a markedly different result in the
case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.7
B. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche
Ultramares involved a third-party claimant who brought an
action against an accountant who, it was alleged, negligently pre-
pared a financial statement for a firm which had employed him
for that purpose. Cardozo wrote the court's opinion exonerating
the accountant. Several excerpts from that opinion are worth
repeating to illustrate Cardozo's fear of extending liability too
far.
If liability for negligence [of an accountant to third parties]
5. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 276.
6. Id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 277 (citations omitted).
7. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a
theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in
the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences.8
Justice Cardozo, again fearful of overextending liability,
remarked in another part of the opinion that extending liability
in Ultramares would expose numerous other occupations to lia-
bility. Cardozo said:
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to
many callings other than an auditor's. Lawyers who certify
their opinion as to the validity of municipal or corporate
bonds, with knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the
notice of the public, will become liable to the investors, if they
have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same extent as if
the controversy were one between client and advisor. Title
companies insuring titles to a tract of land, with knowledge
that at an approaching auction the fact that they have insured
will be stated to the bidders, will become liable to purchasers
who may wish the benefit of a policy without payment of a pre-
mium. These illustrations may seem to be extreme, but they go
little, if any, farther than we are invited to go now.9
Cardozo, of course, was compelled to distinguish Glanzer.
He did so by observing that in Glanzer, the act deemed to be
negligent had been performed for the very purpose of furnishing
a weight certificate to the complaining party. It was "the end
and aim of the transaction," and both principals to the transac-
tion knew this. 10
Prosser, having fallen prey to the compulsion to pigeonhole,
puts both Glanzer and Ultramares in the misrepresentation cat-
egory." Misrepresentation or the action of deceit is a tort deal-
ing with wrongful misrepresentation of facts. It has nothing to
do with negligent performance of duties where negligence is
likely to cause harm. Combining these concepts, as will be evi-
8. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
10. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 445.
11. W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 705-08 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as LAW OF TORTS]. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19
VAND. L. REv. 231, 247 (1966).
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dent from the discussion below, is obviously an error and will
lead to confusion.
Ultramares has drawn considerable criticism."' Decisional
law has also questioned Ultramares. This article will demon-
strate that the reasoning of Ultramares is erroneous and should
be buried for all time, and that the reasoning of Glanzer is whol-
ly applicable in numerous fact situations involving negligent per-
formance of duties. The error of Ultramares became evident in
another Cardozo opinion, H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co. 13
Moch involved a contract between a private waterworks cor-
poration and the City of Rochester for the supply of water.
While the contract was in force a building was destroyed by fire.
The building owner brought suit against the waterworks com-
pany, but the suit was dismissed. It was held that neither a con-
tract action nor a tort action would lie. Cardozo reasoned that
the failure to furnish water was at most the denial of a benefit,
not commission of a wrong.
On facts identical to Moch, a contrary result was reached in
Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co. 14 In Doyle, Justice Mus-
manno, himself an eminent scholar, said of Cardozo that
"Homer nodded.' 5 Once Cardozo recognized that the water
company was guilty of a negligent omission, he admitted that it
had committed a breach of duty, since negligence is, by defini-
tion, a breach of duty. Musmanno, speaking of the Moch case,
pointed out that Professor Seavey thought that Cardozo had
failed to pursue his accustomed method of facing realities. 6
Again, in both Moch and Doyle, there is the situation where
a party to a contract, by the very nature of his contractual
undertaking, places himself in such a position that the law
should impose upon him a duty to perform his undertaking in
12. E.g., Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HAiv. L. REv. 372,
398-404 (1952); Levitin, Accountants' Liability for Defective Financial Reports, 15 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 436, 442-50 (1964) (praising Glanzer and criticizing Ultramares); Note, Negli-
gence-Public Accountants-Duty to Persons Lending Money in Reliance on False
Financial Statements, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 1066 (1950); Note, The Accountants' Liabil-
ity-For What and to Whom, 35 IOWA L. Rzv. 319, 327 (1950). A particularly caustic
criticism of Ultramares will be found in G. EDWARD Wmm, ToRT LAw mI AmzRicA: AN
INTELLECTuAL HISTORY 132-36 (1980).
13. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
14. 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1976).
15. Id. at 208, 199 A.2d at 882.
16. Id.
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such a manner that third parties-strangers to the con-
tract-will not be injured.1 7 It is not the contract per se that
creates the duty; it is the law which imposes the duty because of
the undertaking in the contract. The only party charged with
the duty of furnishing water in Moch was the water company. If
it failed in this regard, the innocent landowner was left to suffer
the damage with no remedy against anyone. This was a totally
irrational result.
As Justice Musmanno observed, Cardozo had conceded that
the water company owed a duty to the homeowners to furnish
them water. Once Cardozo made this concession, the resulting
liability on the water company's part was inevitable. If one has a
duty to another, and failure to perform that duty foreseeably
can cause harm, the failure to perform that duty with care,
which in turn proximately causes harm, creates negligence liabil-
ity. Again, Cardozo's pinch-penny dread of limitless liability,
evidenced in Ultramares, led him into one of his few serious
errors.
Clearly, Cardozo was wrong in Ultramares, at least by mod-
ern standards.18 Modern decisions generally extend the bounda-
ries of tort liability, for example, in the products liability field..
Still, many courts tend to follow Cardozo's decision.1 9 This is
simply another instance where the prestige of this great judge
carries the field. The courts would rather be wrong with Cardozo
than right with the commentators."0
III. Glanzer Versus Ultramares
As this article reveals, commentators have found a contra-
diction between Glanzer and Ultramares. Where Glanzer
extends the boundaries of liability, Ultramares holds them in
check for reasons that cannot withstand analysis. Rusch Factors,
Inc. v. Levin21 points up the glaring inconsistency between the
two decisions. Rusch also rests on the premise that accounting
firms like "the big eight" are so sound financially that the pinch-
penny approach of Ultramares is no longer applicable.
Rusch involved an accountant's negligence liability to a
17. See LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 104, at 676-82.
18. Id. § 94, at 625-26.
19. Id. at 626.
20. Kratovil, Fixtures and the Real Estate Mortgagee, 97 U. PA. L. Rav. 180, 184
n.32 (1948).
21. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968).
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third party. The court held the accountant liable, relying on
Glanzer and rejecting Ultramares. The court asked:
Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the
weighty burden of an accountant's professional malpractice?
Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread
by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass
the cost of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who
can in turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming public?
Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary
techniques of the accounting profession? For these reasons it
appears to this Court that the decision in Ultramares consti-
tutes an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that "[t]he
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R ......
The case at bar is, in fact, far more akin to the case of
Glanzer v. Shephard, . . . another Cardozo opinion and the
first case to extend to persons not in privity, liability for negli-
gent misrepresentation causing pecuniary loss . .. In fact, the
Glanzer principle has been applied to accountants.... The
Glanzer principle also formed the predicate for Lord Denning's
dissent in Candler v. Crane .... In that case, the plaintiff
responded to a company's effort to obtain financing and
requested that he be supplied certified balance sheets. The
defendant accountants, whose balance sheets the plaintiff
relied on, actually knew the plaintiff and prepared the balance
sheets for him, although they were compensated for their ser-
vices by the company. The balance sheets showed solvency,
when in fact there was insolvency. The plaintiff was denied
recovery in a 2-1 decision by the English Court of Appeals.
Lord Denning, dissenting, argued that the risk theory should
be as applicable to cases of economic loss as to cases of prop-
erty damage or personal injury, that the plaintiff's loss of his
investment was the most probable event in light of the defen-
dant's negligence, and that the balance sheet in Candler was,
like the weight certificate in Glanzer, made for the very aim
and purpose of influencing the reliant party's conduct."1
Many courts, however, have not been as successful as the Rusch
court in perceiving and applying the Glanzer rule. This lack of
success is attributable, at least in part, to the confusion of
Glanzer with other theories of liability.
22. Id. at 91-92 (citations omitted). Lord Denning is, of course, one of the great
giants of the law.
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IV. MISREPRESENTATION AS THE SOURCE OF THE CONFUSION
CONCERNING TORT LIABILITY
To articulate the basis for liability to third parties, it is nec-
essary to return to the confusion between liability for misrepre-
sentation and liability for negligent performance (or nonper-
formance) of a duty. The concepts are in fact worlds apart. A
party whose negligence has caused untold harm, moreover, may
be found free from a taint of misrepresentation, with a resulting
verdict for the defendant. This is an incredible miscarriage of
justice. A case that points up the difference between the two
concepts is Hubbard v. State.3
Hubbard involved a suit against a state veterinarian who
negligently diagnosed a herd of cattle as being free of disease.
When the diagnosis proved incorrect, the owner of the cattle
sued the state. The majority opinion rested largely upon sover-
eign immunity and the strict construction given statutes waiving
that immunity. One exception to state liability that was listed in
the statute was a claim arising out of "misrepresentation." The
court thought that the misrepresentation exception was applica-
ble. However, Justice LeGrand dissented. This judge deserves to
be remembered since he perceived the distinction between mis-
representation and the negligent performance of a duty that has
eluded many celebrated judges and authorities. Justice LeGrand
began his dissent by recognizing the exception under the Iowa
statute for misrepresentation. Finding no definition of misrepre-
sentation in the statute, Justice LeGrand turned to general prin-
ciples of law to determine what was included under the term
misrepresentation. He concluded:
There is abundant authority, both in our decisions and those of
other jurisdictions, that plaintiff's petition here is bottomed,
not on misrepresentation, but on negligence. There is nothing
in the Act which changes this.
Here the conduct complained of is a faulty diagnosis of
plaintiff's cattle followed by an erroneous report of their condi-
tion. The misrepresentation which the majority holds to be
covered by the exception in the statute is the very report the
veterinarian was required to furnish as soon as he undertook
the testing of the cattle. The majority treats the duty to prop-
erly test as separable from the duty to accurately report the
23. 163 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1969).
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results of the test.2 '
Justice LeGrand then proceeded to discuss a number of
decisions where negligence liability and misrepresentation liabil-ity had not been properly distinguished. He continued:
[T]hese cases [are] cited ... only to demonstrate that such aclaim as plaintiff asserts is not one which arises out of mis-
representation. Instead the misrepresentation has always
been important only as bearing on the negligent conduct.
Any other result seems indefensible when it is pointed outthat in most instances the services hired are worthless without
the ultimate communication of results from the expert to theone who employed him. Usually that is the only purpose forengaging the expert in the first place. To draw a line on one
side of which he is responsible for negligence in performing
his investigative or diagnostic duties while on the other he is
liable only because he told what he did is nothing less than
casuistry.6
It is very much to Justice LeGrand's credit that he saw the
Glanzer rationale as creating a duty in the Hubbard defendants,
and that he saw Glanzer as making the defendants liable fornegligent performance of that duty. The distinction Justice
LeGrand saw is pointed up by termite inspector cases. If, in atermite case, the inspector negligently fails to detect termite
infestation, it is that negligence that causes the loss, not the vac-
uous reporting of a nonexistent situation.
V. THE FEDERAL DECISIONS
The federal decisions reveal the same confusion regarding
24. Id. at 912.
25. Id. at 913-14 (LeGrand, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The authorities on misrepresentation, particularly innocent misrepresentation, are
numerous. See, e.g., Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
679 (1973) (article is replete with citations, and gives historical background on the
Restatements of Torts). However, the adoption of the unconscionability section of the
UCC has introduced a new approach. See Kratovil, The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts and the UCC: A Real Property Law Perspective, 16 J. MAR. L. Ray. 287, 290-93
(1983); E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTmAcTs § 4.28 (1982). The doctrine of promissory estoppel
now has numerous adherents, and has served to blur the line between contracts and
torts. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965); see
also E. FARNSWORTH, supra, § 3.26, at 191 (commenting on the Red Owl case). There is
an overwhelming rush toward justice and fairness that calls in question many of the
older precedents and articles. A like tendency is evident in England. Burrows, Contract,
Tort and Restitution-A Satisfactory Division or Not?, 99 LAW Q. REv. 217, 256 (1983).
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the difference between negligent misrepresentation and the neg-
ligent performance of an act that one has a duty to perform with
care. Thus, in U.S. v. Neustadt,6 the plaintiff purchaser sued
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, contend-
ing that the Federal Housing Authority had made a negligent
appraisal of the property for the lender. The court held for the
plaintiff, citing Glanzer.27 The court held that the wrongful con-
duct consisted of the negligent appraisal, leading the plaintiffs
to pay more for the property than it was worth.28 The communi-
cation of the results of this negligent appraisal was merely inci-
dental. There was an element of misrepresentation, but it was
relatively unimportant.
The Supreme Court reversed,2 9 stressing the misrepresenta-
tion factor for which the federal government was found not lia-
ble under the particular statute." The same issue arose in Block
v. Neal.3 1
Block, recently decided by the Supreme Court, differed fac-
tually from Neustadt only in that Block involved the Farmer's
Home Administration ("FmHA") and a construction loan. How-
ever, the Block Court held the federal agency liable.3 2 The Block
Court pointed out the difference, maintained by this author,
between misrepresentation liability and negligence liability.33
The Block Court observed that the failure of FmHA to point out
defects to the builder while construction was proceeding could
hardly be regarded as misrepresentation." It was negligence in
supervision, for which the federal agency was liable under the
Tort Claims Act.85 The harm suffered by the purchaser of the
building sprang from negligence, not misrepresentation. The
Court conceded that misrepresentation liability and negligence
liability could overlap.3 6 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that
they represent distinct sources of liability. Thus the highest
26. 281 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1960), rev'd, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
27. Id. at 601.
28. Id.
29. U.S. v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
30. Id. at 706-11.
31. Neal v. Bergland, 646 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub. noma., Block v. Neal,
103 S. Ct. 1089 (1983).
32. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1094-95.
33. Id. at 1094.
34. Id. at 1093-94.
35. Id. at 1094-95.
36. Id.
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court in the land, by unanimous decision, has recognized the dis-tinction between misrepresentation liability and negligence
liability.
Another significant federal decision is First Financial Sav-ings & Loan Assn. v. Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota."7 InFirst Financial, a mortgage lender was guilty of negligence inclosing a real estate sale, to the damage of third parties not inprivity. The court held the lender liable, disregarding priorinconsistent Georgia cases, and relying chiefly on a Fifth Circuitdecision, North American Co. for Life and Health Insurance v.Berger.3 8 The Berger court had held a psychiatrist liable wherehe certified a negligent diagnosis upon which an insurance com-
pany relied. Berger contained a discussion of Ultramares andcited Glanzer for support.9 Clearly, federal courts have comedown on the side of Glanzer principles. Casebook authors havenot been as successful in piercing the confusion as have the fed-
eral courts.
VI. THE CASEBOOKS
The casebooks reveal conflicting views as to where Glanzerand Ultramares should be pigeonholed. These decisions are notmentioned in Closen, Fisher, Perlmutter, and Wittenberg, Con-tracts: Cases and Materials (1981) nor in Dawson and Harvey,Contracts and Contract Remedies (1967). Ultramares is dealtwith in some detail in Kessler and Gilmore, Contracts: Casesand Materials at pages 1032, 1142, 1154, and 1155 (1970).
Ultramares is not included in Keeton and Keeton, Torts: Casesand Materials (1977) but appears in Shulman, James, and Grey,Torts at page 809 (1976). Glanzer appears in Green, Pedrick, et
al., Torts: Cases and Materials at page 797 (1977). Evidently,those who teach contracts and torts are divided in their thinking
as to where these cases should be taught.There is, of course, an explanation for the differing points ofview on the scope of contracts law in a given situation. Thus, ithas been said that types of transactions have marched in andout of the area of contracts.40 Professor Gilmore describes con-tract law as a theoretical construct having little or nothing to do
37. 557 F. Supp. 654 (D.N.D. Ga. 1982).
38. 648 F.2d 305 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
39. Id. at 306.
40. L. FRIEDMAN, CoNTRAcT LAW IN AMERICA 20-24 (1965).
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with the real world.41 He asserts that until the Industrial
Revolution left its mark, the law of contracts did not exist as
such.4" But having come into existence, so-called contracts law,
at least as reflected in the Restatements, developed schizophre-
nia as it was worked over through the opposing views of Willis-
ton and Corbin.4 ' To complicate matters, Cardozo evolved his
own brand of contracts law." As a result, "contracts" is being"reabsorbed" into the mainstream of torts.4 6 Amusingly, Gilmore
suggests that a good first-year course would be "Contorts."'46 In
Gilmore's view of civil liability, as conceived by the twentieth
century mind, each of us is his brother's keeper.4' Law is pro-
cess, flux, change.'8 It should come as no surprise, therefore, to
find current doctrine preferring Glanzer to Ultramares. Fortu-
nately, this trend is appearing in decisional law with the rejec-
tion of a pigeonholing approach.
VII. PIGEONHOLING AND PRIVITY
It is a characteristic of all decisional law to attempt to force
the facts of a lawsuit into some pigeonhole that enables the
court to decide the case by forcing the fact pattern into a famil-
iar category and deciding the case by the rules of law of the pig-
eonhole. Many courts have welcomed an approach moving away
from pigeonholing and combining tort and contracts concepts.
Surprisingly, some courts, dismayed by the trend toward using
both tort and contracts concepts freely, have recently begun a
counterrevolution. Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National
Tank Co.49 is a good example of this return to pigeonholing.
In Moorman, the plaintiff purchased a grain storage tank
from defendant. The tank proved defective and the plaintiff
sued, advancing theories of strict liability in tort, misrepresenta-
tion, and negligence. The court held that the plaintiff could not
41. G. GILMORE, THE DFTH OF CONTRACT 7 (1974).
42. Id. at 8-9.
43. Id. at 60.
44. Id. at 57.
46. Id. at 87.
46. Id. at 90. The merger of contract law into tort law is also described in a recent
English periodical. Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insur-
ance, XII Tim JOURNAL OF L.GAL STUDIES 241 (1983).
47. G. GILMORE, supra note 41, at 95.
48. Id. at 98.
49. 91 IM. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
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recover on these theories.8 0 In direct opposition to the viewsexpressed by Gilmore, the court suggested that there was a dis-tinct line of demarcation between contract and tort cases. Thecourt found that the law of sales, as established in the UniformCommercial Code, spelled out in detail the existing liabilitieswhere a product fails to measure up to the normal buyer'sexpectations, and that for such normal economic loss the pur-chaser would have to sue in contract." The court conceded thateconomic loss is recoverable where one intentionally makes falserepresentations and where one who is in the business of supply-ing information for the guidance of others in their businesstransactions makes negligent representations.2 As in Rozny v.
Marnul,5 the court also conceded that when a product is sold ina defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-sumer, strict liability in tort is applicable for personal injury tothe plaintiff, as well as for physical injury of plaintiff's prop-erty." However, except in these three instances-intentionalmisrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation by one in thebusiness of supplying information, and strict liability-the courtheld that recovery in negligence should not be allowed for eco-nomic losses.15 The Moorman court's discussion reveals that theauthorities are divided on the issue of extending or constrictingnegligence liability in these situations, and the authorities arecopiously cited by the court. Ultramares is mentioned only in
passing. 6 Glanzer is ignored.
The Moorman majority opinion did not discuss privity, butprivity is mentioned in a concurring opinion. The concurringjudge was concerned that allowing recovery for economic lossfrom negligence in contract actions might bring back privity."
An excellent comment observes that Moorman leavesnumerous and substantial questions unresolved.59 The Moormancourt failed to recognize that contract and tort law can overlap
50. Id. at 73-74, 435 N.E.2d at 444-45.
51. Id. at 81-94, 435 N.E.2d at 448-54.
52. Id. at 88-89, 435 N.E.2d at 452.
53. 43 IH. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
54. Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 81, 435 N.E.2d at 448.
55. Id. at 87, 435 N.E.2d at 450.
56. Id. at 88, 435 N.E.2d at 452.
57. Id. at 99, 435 N.E.2d at 456 (Simon, J., concurring).
58. Id.
59. Bertachy, The Economic Loss Doctrine in Illinois After Moorman, 71 ILL. B.J.
346 (1983).
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and that the boundaries of tort law expand and shrink, not
based solely on the boundaries of contract law, but on an analy-
sis of underlying tort principles.8 If the distinction argued for in
Moorman were allowed to stand it would undoubtedly stifle the
growth of tort law.
Instances of gross injustice may occur if the Moorman dis-
tinctions are upheld. For example, suppose a testator wished to
disinherit his heirs. He orders his lawyer to draw up a will leav-
ing an enormous estate to strangers. The will is negligently
drawn. The strangers' action against the lawyer, if there is one,
would properly be a negligence action for economic harm; yet,
Moorman would appear to preclude recovery.
It seems safe to assume that in one way or another the
courts will reject a retreat to privity. 1 Furthermore, the three
exceptions in which Moorman explicitly allows recovery for eco-
nomic harm leave ample room for strangers to recover for negli-
gence in many property law situations. In short, Moorman does
not affect the discussion below outlining the liability of survey-
ors, architects, accountants, and others under the Glanzer
principle.
As to privity of contract viewed from a policy standpoint, it
would seem that it has been greatly weakened by section 402 A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Privity of contract has
virtually expired as a twentieth-century legal concept in negli-
gence cases." The questions are really these:
(1) Has harm occurred to a person or property?
(2) As a matter of socio-economic policy, where should the
loss be allocated?
A rubric like privity of contract offers no help whatever in a
solution of these problems. Thus, a decision like Ultramares
that seeks to hold liability within confines on the basis of the
privity concept is hopelessly behind the times.
VIII. THE PROPER APPROACH
If we are to talk about these problems in terms of duty, we
inevitably come to the key question of the circumstances under
which a duty arises. "No better general statement can be made,
60. Id. at 350.
61. See Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 187, 441 N.E.2d 324, 332 (1982)
(Ryan, C.J., dissenting) (claims majority overrules Moorman).
62. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 615-16, 210 N.E.2d 182, 185 (1965).
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than that the courts will find a duty where, in general, reason-
able men would recognize it and agree that it exists."63 And, of
course, changing social conditions constantly cause the recogni-
tion of new duties." The question, then, is one of justice or
social policy as perceived against the background of the times.
The question is one involving the "weighing of interests."6" This
leads us back to another famous Cardozo decision, Palsgraf,"
and the numerous commentaries following the decision.67
With customary candor, Prosser observes that the question
of liability to the unforeseeable plaintiff must be regarded as an
open one.68 A much stronger case can be made, of course, for
liability to the foreseeable plaintiff. Prosser, unfortunately, rele-
gated his discussion of Glanzer and Ultramares to the chapter
on misrepresentation.69 Misrepresentation is just one of many
tort topics.'7 It is not an important tort and is given short shrift
in the casebooks. Negligence law is of enormous importance.
This is where Glanzer and Ultramares belong. Perhaps, if Pros-
ser had placed Glanzer and Ultramares in the negligence cate-
gory, he would have expanded application of the Glanzer
principle.
It is obvious that the concept of liability to unknown third
parties is one likely to arise initially in a field other than real
property law. Thus, the discussion here begins with a discussion
of some famous decisions by Justice Cardozo in fields other than
real property law. These decisions set the stage for a later dis-
cussion of real property law aspects of the rule.
The author wishes to point out that the battle to eliminate
meaningless labels such as "privity of contract," "privity of
estate," or just plain "privity," is not yet over. By way of exam-
ple, consider the recent cases holding that a builder-seller of a
home impliedly warrants that the construction is sound.7' This
doctrine of implied warranty, less than twenty years old, was
greeted as a great leap forward into the twentieth century, and
as a notable achievement in real property law. When, in the
63. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at 327.
64. Id.
65. L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 128 (1927).
66. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
67. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at 254 n.50.
68. Id. at 258.
69. Id. at 707-08.
70. G. EDWARD WHITE, supra note 12, at 84.
71. See infra note 145.
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same typical fact situation, the second purchaser of a home
brought suit against the builder-seller for breach of his implied
warranty of sound construction, the second purchaser was
greeted by some decisions denying him relief on the ground of
absence of privity, a giant leap back into the nineteenth cen-
tury.7 12 Recognition of the absurdity of these simultaneous leaps
forward and backward finally prompted many courts to permit
the second purchaser to sue and to hold that privity was unnec-
essary. Still, it is disturbing to think that lawsuits can be won
or lost depending on the presence or absence of privity. The
author has characterized privity as a meaningless term because
it has no sensible meaning in resolving the question of whether a
duty exists, and how far liability should extend as a matter of
policy. Privity offers no help in resolving the conflicting socio-
economic values involved. It simply tells us who will win the
lawsuit, a decision made by the court before it decides that priv-
ity is of importance. Were Cardozo writing today, he would not
be in the forefront of those dealing with socio-economic
problems conceptually by use of the privity rubric.
Some lawyers are troubled by the concept of tort liability
arising out of nonperformance or negligent performance of a
contract duty. Prosser explains how the duty arises. With
respect to the duty of a seller of goods, the seller is under a duty
to exercise the care of a reasonable man of ordinary prudence to
see that the goods do no harm to the buyer. This duty, while it
arises out of the relation created by the contract, is not identical
with the contract obligation. It is merely a part of the general
responsibility, sounding in tort, which is placed by the law upon
anyone who stands in such a position that his affirmative con-
duct will affect the interests of others.74
In this area where tort liability has been derived from a fail-
ure to observe a contract duty, a bitter controversy is raging at
present. Probably the first case of importance in this controver-
sial area is Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. 75 In Gruenberg,
the court held that where the obligation of good faith, which
72. See, e.g., Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974) (the implied
warranty extends only to the person buying from the builder-subsequent purchasers
are excluded); see also Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
73. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 183, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330
(1982).
74. LAW oF ToRTs, supra note 11, at 632.
75. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
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inheres in all contracts, is not observed, a cause of action in tort
arises. The authorities are sharply divided on the issue of
whether a tort cause of action arises in such a situation." It is
noteworthy that in Glanzer, Cardozo specifically rejected an
approach that would put the Gruenberg case in a pigeonhole. He
spoke in terms of duty, based upon the economic background of
the situation."
The most illuminating decision this author has been able tofind on the question of how tort liability arises out of a breach of
contract is Dean v. Hershowitz.8 In Dean, a landlord agreed
with his tenant to repair a porch, but the landlord breached the
agreement. The tenant was injured as a result of the breach and
he brought a successful personal injury action. The court
decided that the instance afforded by a landlord's breach of a
covenant to repair is part of the question of when, and to what
extent, a recovery for negligence may be based upon breach of a
contract obligation. This latter problem is, the court said, just
part of the larger problem of the relationship between contract
and tort law. The court chose to view the problem in the same
manner as did Professor Bohlen. The court said:
[Wie adopt Professor Bohlen's statement in his Studies in theLaw of Torts, p. 87: "Modern tendency is to make the funda-mental nature of the obligation the test as to whether theaction is founded upon either tort or contract." As Bohlenpoints out, in many instances where parties through contracthave entered into a definite relationship to each other, as inthe instance of a physician and his patient, a lawyer and hisclient, or a bailor and bailee, the law imposes certain dutiesarising out of the relationship itself as to the use of care; theseit regards as impliedly entering into the contract itself; butthey are in fact more fundamental than the obligation of thecontract. This appears very clearly with reference to the situa-tion of the physician and his patient, because the duty to usereasonable care and skill arises where a physician undertakes
to treat a patient, even in the absence of any contract. In suchsituations an action based upon the failure to use the required
care and skill lies in tort and, if there is a contract, may also lie
in contract.
76. See Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980) for
the authorities on both sides of the issue. See also Bourhis, Recognition and Recovery
for Bad Faith Torts, TRiAL, December 1982, at 46.
77. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 240-41, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922).
78. 119 Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935).
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Negligence occurs where one under a duty to exercise a
certain degree of care to avoid injury to others fails to do so.
... [N]egligence may be the outgrowth of a precedent
contractual relationship, but. . it may also arise in situations
where there is no thought of any such underlying relationship,
as in the ordinary case where two automobiles meet in the
highway. . . [The opinion of Brett, M.R., in Heaven v.
Pender, L.R. 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509, states the principle well:]
"Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a
position with regard to another that every one of ordinary
sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not
use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to
those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the
person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary
care and skill to avoid such danger."79
Here again is revealed an understanding, as in Glanzer, that
if there is a duty, however created, involving foreseeable harm to
others if neglected, negligent performance of that duty causes
liability. Does it matter that the duty happens to spring from a
contract requirement? The Glanzer reasoning was that the
source of the duty was of no consequence. This was correct, of
course, because it is folly to argue that under one label a person
is protected from harm, but under another label no such protec-
tion exists. With this understanding of the Glanzer principle, we
are prepared to examine its role in real property law.
IX. THE ROLE OF REAL PROPERTY LAW
Since it is obvious that contract law and tort law do indeed
overlap, and are compartmentalized only for teaching purposes,
the question arises as to the role of real property law. It is essen-
tial that modern real property principles be scrutinized to deter-
mine whether this separately taught area of the law does indeed
belong logically in the general body of civil law that includes
contracts and tort law. Perhaps, since all three branches of gen-
eral civil law deal with liabilities to third parties, the Glanzer
principle, properly applied to real property cases and to cases
related to real property, might yield some consistent results.
A. Covenant Liability-Fee Title
By the majority rule a running real covenant falls under the
79. Id. at 405-08, 177 A. at 265-66 (citations omitted).
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Statute of Frauds.8" Thus, such a covenant must constitute an
interest in land.81 Surely a covenant that restricts a landowner's
right to use his land in some way effects a subtraction from that
landowner's bundle of rights; only an interest in land can accom-
plish such a result.82 It is said that real covenants run along with
estates "as a bird on a wagon."8 3 Thus, a real covenant is an
interest in land perched upon another interest in land.
That the running covenant has a contract aspect is clear.
Indeed, it has been said that the covenants in a deed constitute
no part of the conveyance, but are "separate contracts." '84 For
example, assume A owns Blackacre. A executes a conveyance of
Blackacre to B. The conveyance contains a running covenant
binding on A. B may sue A if A breaches the covenant because"privity of contract" exists between them. If B conveys before A
breaches, later owners deriving title from B may sue A, basing
their claim on the fact that the covenant, perched on the estate
like a bird on a wagon, was carried thereby into the hands of the
party receiving the estate.
For our purposes, this example suffices to show that for a
long time third parties have been allowed to sue under well-
established principles of real property law. It is generally the
third party who suffers the harm or damage and the third party
who brings the action.
As to the parties in whose favor this liability extends, it
runs, of course, in favor of remote grantees. If the benefitted
land is divided by deeds, it runs in favor of each subdivision. 5
Each grantee of a portion of the burdened premises carries a
portion of the burden.86 Thus, as in Glanzer, liability to
unknown third parties is recognized.
B. Landowner and Landlord Liability
Under older decisions, a landowner's liability to those on his
land without his permission often depended upon the archaic
distinctions between licensees, invitees, and trespassers. The
80. Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 861,
868 (1977).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, REAL PROPERTY § 671, at 705 (abr. ed. 1968).
84. Bagley v. Fletcher, 44 Ark. 153, 160 (1884).
85. 21 C.J.S. Covenants § 62a (1940); 20 AM. JUR. 2d Covenants § 29 (1965).
86. 2 AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.6 at 359 (1952); Annot., 12 A.L.R. 826 (1921).
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modern cases reject these distinctions in favor of a single duty of
reasonable care in all circumstances.8 7 This rule originated in
California in Rowland v. Christian,88 and is also followed in Col-
orado, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island.8
The old law of landlord liability to a tenant was a morass.90
An enormous breach in the general caveat emptor approach took
place when the courts imposed an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity on the landlord. 1 After that there was little point to the old
rules, and so the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Sargent
v. Ross, 92 proceeded to discard them. That court held that land-
lords, like other persons, must exercise reasonable care not to
subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm.
The modern trend has been to hold that a breach of the
landlord's covenant to repair in the lease is a ground for holding
the landlord liable for injuries to his tenant if the failure to
repair was a contributing cause of the injury.93 Here is another
instance where, over the years, the early rule denying recovery
because of the absence of privity has been eroded. The present
rule regarding landlord liability in tort has been broadened to
include within its protection all those properly on the
premises.9"
Here again Prosser tells us that this landlord liability is a
tort liability arising out of a contract relation. 5 Discussing the
philosophy underlying the rule, Prosser concludes that the best
explanation is the undeclared policy placing the responsibility
for harm caused by disrepair upon the party best able to bear
87. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y. 233, 241, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568
(1976).
88. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968). See Note,
Tort-Premises Liability-New York Joins Minority of States Abolishing Trespasser,
Licensee, Invitee Distinctions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 682, 682-83 (1976).
89. Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 508, 520 (Supp. 1983).
90. LAW oF TORTS, supra note 11, § 63, at 399.
91. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Iowa 1972).
92. 113 N.H. 388, 397, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973).
93. Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, 1252 (1961).
94. Lulay v. South Side Trust & Say. Bank, 4 Ill. App. 3d 483, 485-86, 280 N.E.2d
802, 804 (1971); Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d 607, 616-18, 345 N.E.2d 319, 325-26, 381
N.Y.S.2d 848, 853-54 (1976); Rampone v. Wanskuck Bldgs. Inc., 102 R.I. 30, 35-36, 227
A.2d 586, 589 (1967); see also Comment, Landlord-Tenant-Repairs-Landlord Could
be Liable Under Covenant to Repair for Injuries to Tenant's Invitees Caused by Breach
of Such Agreement, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165 (1976).
95. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at 409.
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it." The broad rule of landlord tort liability is supported by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. A variety of reasons are given
for this minority rule. Of interest is the statement that "[tihe
lessor's duty . . . is not merely contractual, although it is
founded upon a contract. It is a tort duty."97
C. Surveyor Liability
The leading case on a surveyor's liability to a third party is
Rozny v. Marnul. 8 In Rozny, a surveyor hired by the seller of a
vacant lot negligently mislocated the corners. The purchaser,
relying on the survey, located his building partly on adjoining
property. The purchaser's suit against the surveyor was sus-
tained. The defense of lack of privity was rejected. The court
also rejected a third-party beneficiary theory, a theory that has
figured in some cases involving faulty abstracts of title.9 The
court instead stated that the case was an instance of a tort lia-
bility arising out of a breach of contract. 100 The court felt that
where a party to a contract is called upon to perform a task, and
the result of that task will disclose information to a known third
party who will rely on it, liability to the third party will arise if
the task is performed negligently. The court leaned heavily on
Glanzer and on Prosser to reach this conclusion. 10'
In Rozny, the court specifically declared that privity of con-
tract had no place in deciding questions of tort liability. 0 2 Lia-
bility would be measured by the scope of the duty owed. The
court agreed with Justice Cardozo in Ultramares that the threat
of unlimited liability should not be disregarded; the court rea-
soned, however, like Justice Cardozo in Glanzer, that in cases
involving negligence of surveyors the class of persons who could
suffer injury would be limited to purchasers and lenders.'03 The
court indicated that innocent parties should not suffer the bur-
den of professional mistakes, and that an Ultramares-type rule
might not cause an improvement in the quality of surveying in
96. Id. at 410.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 comment c (1975).
98. 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969). See also Comment, The Supervising Archi-
tect: His Liabilities and His Remedies When a Worker is Injured, 64 N.W.U. L. REv.
535 (1969).
99. Rozny, 43 Ill. 2d at 59, 250 N.E.2d at 659.
100. Id. at 60, 250 N.E.2d at 660.
101. Id. at 63-68, 250 N.E.2d at 661-63.
102. Id. at 60, 250 N.E.2d at 660.
103. Id. at 61, 250 N.E.2d at 661-62.
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Illinois.104 The great significance of Rozny, of course, lies in the
holding that the negligent surveyor owed a duty to an unknown
plaintiff.
The Rozny court stated that lack of direct contractual rela-
tionship between the parties is not a defense in a tort action.""
Thus, liability would extend to a later purchaser who actually
erects a building in reliance on the survey, not merely the pur-
chaser contemplated at the time the survey was made. This is
but a simple application of modern tort principles applied in
products liability cases, and in the modern decisions rejecting
privity as a meaningless criterion.'"a Lenders who rely on a sur-
vey are specifically mentioned as being protected under
Rozny.107 The Rozny court relied on Glanzer and distinguished
Ultramares. Known reliance by third persons was said to be the
key factor to finding the surveyor liable in Rozny. 08
As has been stated, Rozny has incorrectly been thrown into
the category of cases imposing liability for negligent misrepre-
sentation. c10  Unfortunately, Rozny devotes much of the opinion
104. Id. at 63, 250 N.E.2d at 663.
105. Id. at 60, 250 N.E.2d at 660.
106. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Iil. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
107. Rozny, 43 Ill. 2d at 63, 250 N.E.2d at 661.
108. Id. at 67-68, 250 N.E.2d at 663.
109. O'Brien v. Noble, 106 IM. App. 3d 126, 435 N.E.2d 554 (1982). Thus, in O'Brien,
the court revealed its characterization of Rozny. Speaking of the claim before the court
in O'Brien, the court said:
As to the doctrine of negligent misrepresentation, plaintiffs rely primarily
on a British case decided by the House of Lords: Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller
& Partners, Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465 and its Illinois progeny. In that case an
advertising agency purchased advertisements for a business and assumed per-
sonal responsibility for the cost. The business subsequently became insolvent
and the advertising agency sued the business's bank, alleging that the bank
had been negligent in that it provided plaintiff's bank with erroneous financial
data concerning the business. The House of Lords held that a negligent,
though honest, misrepresentation, spoken or written, may give rise to a cause
of action for damages for loss caused thereby, apart from any contract or
fiduciary relationship, since law will imply a duty of care when a person seek-
ing information from a party possessed of special skills trusts him to exercise
due care, and that party knew or ought to have known that reliance was being
placed on his skill and judgment. ([1964] A.C. 465, 486, 502, 514.) Since the
bank, in providing the financial data, expressly disclaimed any responsibility
therefor, this rule was held inapplicable to the defendant in the case, however.
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the general rationale of Hedley Byrne
in Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E. 2d 656.
O'Brien, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 128-29, 435 N.E.2d at 556 (emphasis added).
Here again the emphasis of the court was placed on misrepresentation, whereas the
cause of the loss was negligent performance. The incorrect reporting is but an incident to
the main task. Of course, the action of deceit is an old, familiar one, and it is easier to
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to the doctrine of misrepresentation, for it is evident that the
fault of the surveyor lies in the incorrect location of the bounda-
ries, not in incorrect depiction of the already incorrect bounda-
ries. Most of an average surveyor's time is spent in the field
determining boundaries. Drawing the picture is a minor activity
of the surveyor. The point is that the reporting of the surveyor
is irrelevant. Precisely the same result would be reached if either
the contractor began work before the survey was prepared, going
by the stakes found on the ground, or if the surveyor negligently
did his surveying, correctly reported his work, and the contrac-
tor began his work based on the report. It is not the reporting of
the negligent work which is significant, but rather the negligent
work of the surveyor.
On facts identical with those in Rozny, a California court
came to the same conclusion as the Rozny court. Referring to
Rozny, the court in Kent v. Bartlett " said:
The [Rozny] court enumerated several factors which it consid-
ered relevant to its holding. Among these factors were the
defendant's knowledge that the survey plat would be used andrelied upon by others than the person ordering it, including the
plaintiffs; the fact that potential liability would be restricted to
a comparatively small group and that ordinarily, only one
member of that group would suffer loss; the undesirability of
requiring an innocent reliant party to carry the burden of a
surveyor's professional mistake; and the fact that recovery by a
reliant user whose ultimate use was foreseeable would promote
cautionary techniques among surveyors.'
Of course, a case can be found that rejects the enlightened
Rozny approach. For example, Essex v. Ryan" 2 rejected the
views expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts." 3 Interest-
ingly, the court perceived an analogy to the Ultramares situa-
tion and embraced Ultramares thinking, but the court cites in
support the case of Ryan v. Kanne,"4 which followed Glanzer,
place the desired result in a familiar framework. But the identical problem arises where
no reporting is involved, as where a lawyer draws a faulty will and the intended devisee
is deprived of a fortune. This is a civil wrong wholly outside the field of misrepresenta-
tion, and it is high time that the courts come to grips with the problem.
110. Kent v. Bartlett, 49 Cal. App. 3d 724, 122 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1975).
111. Id. at 730, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 618 (discussing Rozny, 43 Ill. 2d at 67-68, 250
N.E.2d at 663).
112. Essex v. Ryan, - Ill. App. -, 446 N.E.2d 368 (1983).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 552 (1976).
114. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
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not Ultramares. Essex is decidedly lacking in scholarship.
D. Abstractor Liability
Obviously, no curious landowner ever orders an abstract
made to determine whether he owns an unencumbered title to
the land. An abstract is made only when a sale or mortgage (usu-
ally both) makes it necessary to produce evidence of title. In
many sections of the Midwest it is the custom for the contract of
sale to require the vendor to furnish the purchaser an abstract
and to deliver it to the purchaser's attorney for examination. If
the purchaser is obtaining a substantial loan, the contract may
require the vendor to deliver the abstract to the lender's attor-
ney. In the latter case it is perfectly obvious to the abstractor
that the purchaser will rely on the abstract delivered to the
lender.
This providing of an abstract during a real estate sale
presents a typical situation calling for application of Glanzer.
Nevertheless, there are many decisions holding that the
abstractor is liable only to the hiring party, namely, the vendor.
As to the others, privity is said to be lacking.115 Sometimes the
purchaser is sophisticated and requires that the abstract be"certified" to the purchaser. The sophisticated lender, of course,
always insists that the abstract be "certified" to the lender.
A rule of law should not be permitted to exist that rests on
this kind of technical nonsense. Surely, this rule of privity is
doomed. In Williams v. Polgar,1 the Michigan Supreme Court
boldly set out on a Glanzer course and held the abstractor, hired
by the vendor, liable to the purchaser for negligence.1 1 7 The
authorities were exhaustively explored. An appendix to the case
gives the state of the law on a state-by-state basis. The court
adopted in its reasoning much of the reasoning found in
Rozny.1 18
In Kovaleski v. Tallahassee Title Co., 19 the court followed
Polgar. In Kovaleski, a purchaser at a tax sale relied upon an
abstract furnished to the tax collector. The abstract negligently
omitted some outstanding titles and the tax purchaser brought
115. Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1122, 1127 (1970).
116. 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974).
117. Id. at 17, 215 N.W.2d at 158.
118. Id. at 13-16, 215 N.W.2d at 154-57.
119. 363 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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an action. The court held the abstractor liable based upon the
principles in the Restatement (Second) of Torts'2 0 dealing with
faulty information furnished by one who is in the business of
furnishing information. This section represents basically a
Glanzer-type approach to the problem. The court followed Pol-
gar and observed that the requirement of privity was
disappearing.
The Kovaleski court also cited with approval A.R. Moyer,
Inc. v. Graham.12 ' In Moyer the court sustained an action of a
general contractor brought against the owner's architect for neg-
ligent supervision of construction. The Moyer court observed
that privity was a theoretical device of the common law which"recognizes limitation of liability commensurate with the com-
pensation for contractual acceptance of risk. The sharpness of
its contours blurs when brought into contact with modern con-
cepts of tort liability.' 22 The Moyer court indicated that it was
laying down a tort rule for imposing liability on those whose
activities cause harm to persons who might foreseeably be
injured.123
While the Moyer opinion is written in terms of the faulty
information furnished, certainly in the case of the architect the
basic complaint concerning him is the faulty performance of his
job. The architect's job, when he is hired to supervise construc-
tion, is to detect faulty construction. Relaying information to the
landowner or lender that the construction is faulty is an
extremely minor aspect of his duties. To "supervise" means far
more than the furnishing of information.
In many of the misrepresentation cases discussed by the
courts, there is a job to do and a report to make. The job is done
negligently but the report accurately depicts the results of the
negligent job. The heart of the matter is faulty job performance,
not misrepresentation. This is clearly evident from the misrepre-
sentation cases where no report is contemplated, as where a
faulty will is drafted and the expectations of the devisee are
defeated. Faulty job performance is the heart of the matter in
cases like Moch,2 where a private water company negligently
fails to maintain adequate water pressure and the plaintiff's
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
121. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).
122. Id. at 399.
123. Id. at 402.
124. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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home is destroyed by fire. In these cases no report is contem-
plated, harm to specific individuals is clearly foreseeable, and
the arguments against liability seem specious."' 5
The abstractor is invariably hired in a transfer or mortgage
of real property. Courts have analyzed his liability either in con-
tract or tort terms. But the issue remains, as a matter of general
civil liability, who should bear the loss when the abstractor is
negligent. As can be seen from Polgar, the court groped about
before it fastened on the theory of negligent misrepresentation.
The fault seems to be in the Restatement, which fails to distin-
guish between negligent performance and negligence in unearth-
ing information.
E. Architect Liability
In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Helimuth, Obata & Kassabaum,
Inc. ,126 a surety in a performance bond successfully sued the
contractor's architect for negligent supervision. The court relied
upon Westerhold v. Carroll,127 and Hall v. Union Indemnity
Co. 2 ' The Kassabaum court quoted from the Missouri Supreme
Court's approval of the Hall decision. The Missouri Supreme
Court had noted that in Hall, as in Glanzer:
[T]he person not in strict privity of contract who would be
injured by defendant's negligence was known, and the "end
and aim" of the provision of the contract with respect to pay-
ments, was the benefit of the surety, as well as the owner.1 9
The Kassabaum court also believed that eliminating the privity
requirement would not lead to excessive liability, nor to liability
exposure to an unlimited number and indeterminate class of
people.130
The Kassabaum court referred to recent annotations which
bear on the architect's liability to third parties for negligence in
supervision, and which reveal a split of authority on this ques-
tion. 31 To some extent, the annotations are outdated because
125. The general subject of abstractor liability is covered in Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d
1122 (1970), which is a singularly uninspired annotation on the subject.
126. 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1968).
127. 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967).
128. 61 F.2d 85 (8th Cir. 1932).
129. Aetna, 392 F.2d at 475-76.
130. Id.
131. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 869 (1974); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1955). See also
Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 216 (Alaska 1982); Krieger v. J.E. Greiner Co., 282 Md.
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the American Institute of Architects' ("AIA") documents have
stricken the word "supervise" and merely require the architect
to "observe." Besides the architect's liability for supervision, the
architect's tort liability for economic damages suffered by the
contractor has been recognized, as has the architect's liability for
personal injuries caused by faulty plans.'
If we are to resolve the architect's liability in the usual torts
manner, by seeking a duty, then it has been argued that the
question of duty is a policy issue in which the burden on the
supervising architect is outweighed by the need to protect the
worker. 13 3 Again, the ALA documents attempt to exculpate the
architect of liability. 3 4 Whether the AIA disclaimers will survive
a legal challenge is still a matter for conjecture. 3 5
Architects' attorneys argue in favor of Ultramares and, inci-
dentally, in favor of the privity defense. They contend that the
privity defense shields contracting parties from those to whom
no duty was intended.'36 It has been argued that a party who has
not paid for professional expertise should not have the privilege
of relying upon it. 137 However, if an architect is negligent in
drawing plans for structures in the public portions of a hotel,
and members of the public using these public areas are injured
or killed, a matter clearly foreseeable by the architect, does it
matter that the persons so suffering paid no portion of the archi-
tect's fee? The arguments of architects' attorneys are plainly
absurd.
The law is extremely difficult to state with respect to an
architect. In the first place, the AIA dominates this field. Its
elaborate documentation is the predominant form of architect
and construction documentation today. Sophisticated developers
rewrite this documentation because it is heavily loaded on the
side of the architect. 3 8 How the heavily exculpatory language
50, 57-58, 382 A.2d 1069, 1074 (1978).
132. Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 455 (1980); Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 249 (1975).
133. Miller, The Liability of the Architect in his Supervisory Function, FORUM,
Jan. 1966, at 28.
134. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 25.24 (2d
ed. 1979).
135. See, e.g., Comment, The Supervising Architect: His Liabilities and His Reme-
dies When a Worker Is Injured, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 535, 547 (1969).
136. Note, Liability of Architects and Engineers to Third Parties: A New
Approach, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 306, 312 (1977).
137. Id.
138. Trapasso, The Lawyer's Use of AIA Construction Contracts, PRAC. LAW., May
1973, at 37.
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and the plaintiff's efforts to void its effect will fare in court is an
open question, and there is a vast volume of literature on this
issue.1""
Under some state statutes an architect may become liable to
injured third parties where the architect is "in charge" of the
work.140 These statutes are, unfortunately, beyond the scope of
this article. Imposition of liability on architects in recognition of
the Glanzer principle is, of course, a speedy means to recognize
realities; this imposition of liability is properly one for legisla-
tures in light of the policy questions presented by the issue.
F. Construction and Home Purchase Cases: Builder-Seller,
Contractor, and Landowner Liability
The leading and most publicized case assaulting the citadel
of privity as it relates to builders and injured third parties is the
New York case of Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority.141
In Inman, a child of a tenant in an apartment building was
injured in a fall from a defectively constructed porch. The
builder was held liable. The Inman court applied the reasoning
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,142 and cited many cases
holding that one who erects a structure falls within the Mac-
Pherson rule.
In Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Construction Co.,148 a
builder sold a house to a couple, who later sold the house to the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs brought an action against the builder-
seller for negligence in roof construction. The court rejected the
defendant's plea of lack of privity. The court considered the
development of a manufacturer's liability since Winterbottom v.
Wright,1" when tort and contract law became intermingled in
that court's reasoning, and privity of contract became a factor in
139. Carey, Assessing Liability of Architects and Engineers for Construction
Supervision, 1979 INS. L.J. 147; Hoeveler, Building Failure and the Respective Liabili-
ties of the Architect and the Engineer, 8 FORUM 481 (1973); Murphy, The Impact of the
1976 Edition of AIA Document A201 on the Liability of Architects and Engineers to the
Construction Surety for Negligent Certification of Payments, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 200
(1978); Comment, The Supervising Architect: His Liabilities and His Remedies When a
Worker Is Injured, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 535 (1969).
140. See, e.g., Robinson v. Greeley & Hanson, 86 111. App. 3d 1082, 408 N.E.2d 723
(1980).
141. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895 (1957).
142. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
143. 79 N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 798 (1968).
144. 10 M&W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
[Vol. 7:259
A Real Property Perspective
manufacturer's tort liability. The court noted:
Since that time, and as the dominance of the industrial com-
plex in our society has created a need for an increase in the
purview of manufacturers' responsibilities to the public, courts
have noted various exceptions to the privity of contract
requirement. . . . Under the present posture of the law, the
great weight of authority no longer recognizes privity of con-
tract as having a place in tort law. 45
Furthermore, by the great weight of modern authority, a
builder-seller is held to have given an implied warranty of sound
construction.' 6 This rule, derived by analogy to the Uniform
Commercial Code, and originating in the last twenty years, has
found favor in the legal periodicals. 4"
The question that has troubled the courts is whether liabil-
ity is confined to the first purchaser, where privity of contract is
present, or extends also to later purchasers. Elden v. Simmons148
held that a builder-seller was liable to a second purchaser for
home defects and rejected the defense of lack of privity. At least
145. Steinberg, 79 N.M. at 124, 440 P.2d at 799 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
146. Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Columbia Western
Corp. v. Vela, 122 Ariz. 28, 592 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. App. 1979); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark.
1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d
88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964);
Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn.
Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (1970); Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C.
1978); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. dismissed, 264 So.
2d 418 (Fla. 1972); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Petersen v.
Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979); Weck v. A:M Sunrise
Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280
N.E.2d 300 (1972).
147. Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Prop-
erty, 53 Geo. L.J. 633 (1965); Jaeger, The Warranty of Habitability, 47 CI.-KENT L.
REv. 1 (1970); Nielsen, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Real Property-Time for a Reap-
praisal, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 484 (1968); Valore, Products Liability for a Defective House, 18
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319 (1969); Comment, Real Property-Implied Warranties-Sale of
House by Builder-Vendor Creates an Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 24
ALA. L. REv. 332 (1972); Note, Contracts-Caveat Emptor-Implied Warranty of Hab-
itability, 12 DuQ. L. REv. 109 (1973); Note, An Implied Warranty of Fitness and Suita-
bility for Human Habitation as Applied to the Sales of New Homes in Texas, 6 Hous.
L. REv. 176 (1968); Note, Builder-Vendor Liability for Construction Defects in Houses,
55 MARQ. L. REv. 369 (1972); Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of Real Estate, 26 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 838 (1972); Note, Torts-Implied Warranty in Real Estate-Privity
Requirement, 44 N.C.L. REv. 236 (1965); Note, Vendor & Purchaser, Abrogation of
Caveat Emptor in New Homes Sales by Builder-Vendors, 7 U. RICH. L. REv. 399 (1972).
148. 631 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1981). See Comment, Implied Warranties of New Homes,
17 TULSA L.J. 753 (1982).
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four bases of liability are available in a case of builder-seller lia-
bility toward a purchaser, namely, negligence, implied warranty
in tort, strict tort liability, and extension of implied warranties
in contract. On one theory or another, many courts have allowed
the second purchaser to sue the builder-seller for defects in con-
struction.1 4 9 Modern courts are, evidently, concerned with jus-
tice, not rules. Whether the concept is one of tort, contract, or
property law, the result is the same. The loss is placed where it
belongs-on the party who caused it and who should foresee the
harm to third parties.
In Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v. Russo,150 a tenant and her
invitee were injured when a concrete slab collapsed. It had been
supplied by the general contractor who had contracted with the
owner. The contractor was held liable. The Russo court quoted
Prosser from his Handbook on the Law of Torts. 51 In this
quoted passage, Prosser refers to the direct warranty of the
builder-seller of a new house to the initial buyer. Prosser then
notes how the analogy of the manufacturer of chattels held lia-
ble to third persons injured by manufacture of a defective prod-
uct led inevitably to the extension of builder-seller strict liability
to third persons injured by the builder-seller's negligent per-
formance. Prosser cited Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.152 as the
first significant case in this line of cases. The Schipper court
held that the warranty of the builder-seller of a new house to the
initial buyer also protected a child of the buyer injured by a
defective water heating apparatus. 5 3 Prosser noted that this
decision had been followed in three states and predicted that it
would rapidly become the prevailing rule.'"
Schipper has received comment in several articles. 55 This
149. Cosineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980); Blagg v. Hunt Co., 272 Ark.
185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 611
(1976); Hermes v. Staino, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (1981); Terlinde v. Neely,
275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Moxley v. Laramie-Terlinde Builders Inc., 600 P.2d
733 (Wyo. 1979); see also Annot., 10 A.L.R.4th 385 (1981).
150. 34 Md. App. 25, 366 A.2d 101 (1976).
151. Id. at 37-38, 366 A.2d at 109 (quoting LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at 680-82).
152. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
153. Id.
154. California, Florida and Mississippi have followed the Schipper decision. LAW
OF TORTS, supra note 11, at 680-82 (quoted in Russo, 34 Md. App. at 38, 366 A.2d at
109).
155. Note, Real Property: Builder-Vendors: Liability for Negligence and for Breach
of Implied Warranty of Habitability: Schipper v. Levitt and Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d
314 (1965), 51 CORNELL L.Q. 389 (1966); Note, Torts: Liability of Building Contractors
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case involved the child of a tenant of a remote grantee who suf-
fered injuries resulting from defective construction and was per-
mitted to maintain an action against a builder-seller. Other
cases along the same line followed the Schipper court.' In this
line of cases privity was disregarded as it was in Glanzer, and
the injured party was allowed to maintain the cause of action.
Furthermore, not only the subsequent purchaser was permitted
to sue; any injured member of his family was also permitted to
maintain the action. Thus, both vertical and horizontal privity
have been discarded as requirements in these builder-seller lia-
bility cases.
A general contractor may be liable to third parties if he fails
to properly supervise a subcontractor's work.157 The fact that
the landowner has entrusted the construction job in a contractor
does not relieve him of liability to third parties. If he retains
some supervisory powers, this may be sufficient to create liabil-
ity in him toward third parties. 15 8
Application of Glanzer to construction cases can lead to lia-
bility being imposed upon other individuals as well. For
instance, a landowner has been permitted to recover from the
general contractor's roofing subcontractor for the subcontrac-
tor's negligence, despite the absence of privity.'" And in Stew-
art v. Cox,' 0 a subcontractor was held liable to the unknown
third party buyers of a home being built. In Laukkannen v.
Jewel Tea Co.,"' a workman injured as a result of faulty plans
or faulty working drawings by the defendant engineer was per-
for Defects in Construction, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 469 (1966); Note, Strict Liability in
Tort-Builder- Vendor of Mass Produced House Strictly Liable for Injuries Caused by
Construction Defects, 41 WASH. L. Riv. 166 (1966).
156. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969);
Wright v. Crative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972); Cooper v. Cordova
Sand & Gravel, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. 1972). This was followed, as to the land
itself, in Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 695, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969);
Calvera v. Green Springs, Inc., 220 So. 2d 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 912 (1966); See
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d
554 (Tex. 1968).
157. Chesin Const. Co. v. Epstein, 8 Ariz. App. 312, 446 P.2d 11 (1968).
158. Reber v. Chandler High School Dist. 202, 13 Ariz. App. 133, 474 P.2d 852
(1970).
159. Gilbert Fin. Corp. v. Steelform Const. Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 65, 145 Cal. Rptr.
448 (1978).
160. 55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1961).
161. 78 Ill. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966).
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mitted to recover. 162 These cases represent application to con-
struction fact situations of the principle of liability to unknown
third parties whom the individual reasonably foresees will suffer
by his negligent performance of his job.
The Glanzer principle has been applied to impose liability
on individuals more remote to the construction process or home-
purchase process, but in cases which, nevertheless, affect prop-
erty law. For example, an informative case on soil tester liability
is M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary District.'" In
Miller, a soil test was made negligently and a third-party con-
tractor suffered harm because his bid for the construction job,
based on the soil test, proved inadequate.1" The court relied
upon Biakanja v. Irving,"' which involved a draftsman of a
faulty will who was held liable to the intended devisee. Prosser
approves Miller,'" and of course, Miller presents a situation
perfect for the application of Glanzer. Other examples of where
Glanzer is applicable to an occupation incidentally related to
real property cases are those cases holding that pest control
companies are liable for negligent searches where the company
was hired by one other than the injured party.167 In these cases,
harm to a particular purchaser or lender is plainly foreseeable;
like Glanzer, information is sought from the pest controller
because his expertise is needed to detect the defect. Again, a sit-
uation ripe for application of Glanzer is presented.
The termite cases clearly illustrate the misconception of
courts that arises in many of the cases, although the courts quite
properly impose liability on individuals toward third parties.
The courts talk at length about the duty to convey information
with care, but this reasoning misses the point. In the termite
cases the defendant has no information to convey because he has
not done his job carefully. Through negligence, he failed to
detect the presence of termite infestation. His report in effect
162. Id. at 156-57, 222 N.E.2d at 586. As to engineers, one must always be aware of
the documentation prepared by the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE),
which is quite similar to the AIA documents.
163. 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961).
164. Id. at 307, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
165. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
166. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 231, 250
(1966).
167. Williams v. Jackson, 359 So. 2d 798 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (pest company hired
by FHA and home buyer recovered, the court citing Rozny); Johnson v. Walls, 38 N.C.
App. 406, 248 S.E.2d 571 (1978).
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says, "There is nothing to report." Had he done his job care-
fully, he would have had something quite important to report.
The discussion about the misinformation supplied by the pest
controller misses the mark. It is failure to do the job with care
that is at issue and the common sense recognition that failure to
do the job with care would cause harm to a third party. Justice
LeGrand's decision in Hubbard v. State68 is so important
because he grasps the significance of this distinction.
G. Appraiser Liability
In Stotlar v. Hester,6 9 the plaintiffs had purchased real
estate in reliance upon an appraisal made by the sellers'
appraiser. The court held the appraiser liable for negligence
despite the absence of privity. The court referred to earlier
authorities that relied upon Ultramares and rejected them. The
court referred with approval to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts and rejected the contract theory of third party benefi-
ciary. 170 The question that is left in one's mind is why did the
Stotlar court emphasize the imparting of erroneous information,
rather than the duty to do a job with care.
The question of an appraiser's liability to a third party
arose in Larsen v. United Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion,17 1 where the appraiser was hired by the lender. The
appraiser's negligence in making the appraisal was conceded.
The court held the appraiser liable to the third party home pur-
chaser. The court observed that the Ultramares reasoning had
been rejected in Ryan v. Kanne.17 1 In a footnote, the court
observed that the Ultramares rationale had been rejected by
several modern courts and commentators. 7 3 In defining the par-
ties to whom the duty of care was owed, the court said:
Nor is it necessary, under the Ryan analysis, that the party
168. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
169. 92 N.M. 26, 582 P.2d 403 (1978).
170. Id. at 29, 582 P.2d at 406; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552
(1976).
171. 300 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1981) (citations omitted).
172. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
173. Larsen, 300 N.W.2d at 286. See also, Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Natl Bank v.
Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Fac-
tors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-92 (D.R.I. 1968); Besser, Privity?-An Obsolete
Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SKroN HALL 507, 541-42
(1976); Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTRE
DAmE LAW. 838, 850-57 (1977).
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suing for negligence be the only party for whom the informa-
tion was provided. It is enough that he or she be a third party
whom the negligent provider of the information knew would
utilize it. Even though the appraisal might be made primarily
for the benefit of the lending institution, the appraiser should
also reasonably expect the home purchaser, who pays for the
appraisal and to whom the results are reported (and who has
access to the written report on request), will rely on the
appraisal to reaffirm his or her belief the home is worth the
price he or she offered for it. The purchaser of the home should
be among those entitled to rely on the accuracy of the report
and therefore should be entitled to sue for damages resulting
from a negligent appraisal.1 7 '
The Larsen court then proceeded to define duty. Quoting from
Prosser, the court said:
In negligence cases the duty is always the same, to conform to
the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the
apparent risk ...
[lit should be recognized that "duty" is not sacro-
sanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.1 7 '
Thus again, we come back to the question: Given the socio-
economic background, where is it best to allocate the loss? The
key question becomes an easy one. Could the appraiser foresee
that the buyer would rely on the appraisal? In a recent article it
is argued that, so far as appraisers are concerned, they are liable
to persons with whom they have no contractual relationship, but
who they know will rely on the appraisal. 176 In Alva v. Clon-
inger,1 7 the court held that the purchaser of a home who relied
upon an appraisal furnished to the lender could sue the
appraiser for negligence. The court observed that the absence of
contractual privity is not a bar to the plaintiff's recovery in
tort.1 78 This is clearly an effort by the courts to apply the
Glanzer principle.
174. Larsen, 300 N.W.2d at 287.
175. Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
176. Mastaglio, Real Estate Appraisal Malpractice: Liability and Damages, 54 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 6 (1982).
177. 51 N.C. App. 602, 277 S.E.2d 535 (1981).
178. Id. at 610, 277 S.E.2d at 540.
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H. Accountant's and Attorney's Liability
The principles of Glanzer have been applied to find
accountants and attorneys liable in certain situations important
for their implications in real property cases. In Ryan v. Kan-
ner, 7 a party known to the accountant as one who would rely
on the accounting statement recovered from the accountant for
his negligence. The Ryan court discussed at length both
Ultramares and Glanzer in order to uphold accountant liability.
The court said:
The reluctance of the courts to hold the accounting profession
to an obligation of care which extends to all reasonably foresee-
able reliant parties is predicated upon the social utility ration-
ale first articulated in [Ultramares]. There the defendants neg-
ligently overvalued the company's assets in the balance sheet
upon which the plaintiff creditors of the company subsequently
relied. The wisdom of that decision has been doubted and crit-
icized by law review writers . . . . We are disposed to depart
from that strict rule under the circumstance appearing
therein. . . . When the accountant is aware that the balance
sheet to be prepared is to be used by a certain party or parties
who will rely thereon in extending credit or in assuming liabil-
ity for obligations of the party audited, the lack of privity
should be no valid defense to a claim for damages due to the
accountant's negligence. We know of no good reason why
accountants should not accept the legal responsibility to known
third parties who reasonably rely upon financial statements
prepared and submitted by them.' 80
The Ryan court went on to note the trend towards relaxing the
privity requirement in tort cases where physical injury to third
parties is reasonably foreseeable and the courts' simultaneous
reluctance, on the other hand, to extend liability in the case of
third party financial losses to defendants who might thereby be
exposed to liability to a large unascertained class. The court con-
cluded, however, that the test to be applied is the one enunci-
ated by the Glanzer court, that is, whether the third party to
whom the accountant owes a duty of care is actually foreseen
and a member of a limited class of persons contemplated. The
Ryan court recognized that this rule could very well be applied
179. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
180. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
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to other professions as well.181
Of all the decisions on accountant liability decided since
Ultramares, by far the most important is Spherex, Inc. v. Alex-
ander Grant & Co.' 82 In Spherex, the corporation involved hired
an accounting firm to prepare an unaudited financial statement
covering a twelve-month period. A copy of this statement was
furnished to one of the corporation's suppliers, who extended
credit and suffered a loss. The supplier successfully sued the
accounting firm. The defense of lack of privity was rejected.
After rejecting the privity defense summarily, the court observed
that judges have not hesitated to permit recovery where the
plaintiff's identity was known to the negligent defendant. But
beyond that situation, the Spherex court said, is the question
whether the defendant has some special reason to anticipate the
reliance of the plaintiff. The Spherex court then observed that
Ultramares is a relic of a bygone economic era. The role of the
giant accounting firm in today's business transactions, the court
said, is a far cry from the fledgling profession in need of judicial
protection that existed at the time of Ultramares.s1 8 Finally, the
Spherex court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts. " While
the court agreed that the determining factor of liability was the
foreseeability of harm from negligence in performance of a duty,
the court clung to an exception where there is a risk of limitless
liability to a vast number of plaintiffs. The court concluded that:
[w]hile an accountant is to employ a sufficient degree of care in
the performance of professional activities in order to protect
himself from liability, the law must not arbitrarily extend that
liability beyond his reasonable expectations as to whom the
information will reach. "The risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed ... ,
In Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 86 the court
found that an accountant's securities registration statement con-
181. As to accountant's liability to third parties, see Wiener, Common Law Liability
of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN Dmo L.
REv. 233 (1983) (covering Ultramares and Glanzer); Note, Accountants' Liability for
Compilation and Review Engagements, 60 TEx. L. REV. 759, 770 (1982) (discussing
Ultramares).
182. 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982).
183. See Note, Accountant's Liability for Negligence-A Contemporary Approach
for a Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 402 (1979).
184. Spherex, 122 N.H. at 905, 451 A.2d at 1312.
185. Id. (citations omitted).
186. 283 F. Supp. 643, 683-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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tained false and misleading information, resulting in liability to
third parties. With respect to an accountant's liability, the
accounting profession had felt that prior to the Securities Act
the entire question of an accountant's liability to third parties
had been left open by Ultramares.1 87 The BarChris case rein-
forces this notion. 88 Where a statute plugs a gap left open by
controversial case law, this is a tacit recognition that the case
law was unsatisfactory. The BarChris court ended the unsatis-
factory situation by rejecting Ultramares and finding account-
ants liable to third parties for negligence based on the Securities
Act.
The accountant's role in real property transactions cannot
be overestimated. In putting together any large-scale real estate
transaction, the old bricks-and-mortar appraisal has disap-
peared. Financial statements, cash flow, triple-A credit, income
tax consequences-this is the jargon of today's real estate trans-
action. Possible unknown plaintiffs are members of syndicates
purchasing limited partnership interests. This sort of thing is
not found in contracts or torts casebooks. But neither is it found
in real property casebooks. This theory of liability to remote
third parties in such a situation cuts across many fields and may
emerge in a casebook on real estate planning that contains
lengthy sections of income tax law.
The recent commentators reject Ultramares reasoning and
argue for liability to third parties who rely on financial state-
ments.189 The "big eight" accounting firms represent huge aggre-
gations of capital, with worldwide establishments that dwarf the
legal profession. Ultramares has no application to such
situations.
In Biakanja v. Irving,190 a draftsman of a will was held lia-
ble to a legatee where the will was held void for the defendant's
negligence. The court discussed Ultramares and then turned to
a Glanzer-type analysis stating:
187. See, e.g., Shonts v. Hirlman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
188. See Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Defined, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1411,
1418-19 & n.45 (1968) (citing criticism by L. Loss of Ultramares).
189. Note, Accountants' Liability for Compilation and Review Engagements, 60
TFx. L. REv. 758, 773 (1982); Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public
Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DImGo L. REv. 233 (1983) (article is
of special interest because of its observations on the opaque, virtually incomprehensible
language of Comment a to RasTATzMwrr (SEcoN) oF Tos § 552. As in the present
article, Wiener relies on cases like Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958)).
190. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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The determination whether in a specific case the defendant
will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of
policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among
which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the close-
ness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defen-
dant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm....
Here, the "end and aim" of the transaction was to provide for
the passing of Maroevich's estate to plaintiff. See Glanzer v.
Shepard .... Defendant must have been aware from the
terms of the will itself that, if faulty solemnization caused the
will to be invalid, plaintiff would suffer the very loss which
occurred. As Maroevich died without revoking his will, plain-
tiff, but for defendant's negligence, would have received all of
the Maroevich estate, and the fact that she received only one-
eight [sic] of the estate was directly caused by defendant's
conduct.191
As is evident, the court preferred a Glanzer result to an
Ultramares result. A similar result was reached in Licata v.
Spector.19 2
The Biakanja case precipitated a volume of California cases
holding attorneys liable to third parties, ' but the general run of
decisions still protects an attorney from actions by third parties
despite his negligence in examining title.'" No sound reason has
been advanced for this view. It seems like a case of the judges
protecting their own. The proper ethical position is just the
opposite.
A comprehensive note on the question of attorney's liability
to third parties19 5 discussed Glanzer, Ultramares, Rozny, and
many other decisions. It concludes:
Extending the protection of the law to certain foreseeable third
parties who have been harmed because they relied on the pro-
191. Id. at 650-51, 320 P.2d at 19 (citations omitted).
192. 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966).
193. Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1181, 1191 (1972).
194. Id. at 1200.
195. Note, Attorney Negligence in Real Estate Title Examination and Will Draft-
ing: Elimination of the Privity Requirement as a Bar to Recovery by Foreseeable Third
Parties, 17 Naw ENG. 955 (1982). See also R. MALLEN & R. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACnCE §
78, at 150-52 (approving Biakanja and preferring Glanzer to Ultramares); see also id. §
80, at 158 n.94 (citing many cases holding the attorney liable to third parties).
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fessional expertise of lawyers is a valid goal. In fairness to the
great majority of capable and careful practitioners upon whom
the carelessness of other attorneys reflect, this extension may
be viewed as essential to continued confidence in the legal pro-
fession. Public policy considerations should weigh heavily
against protecting attorneys from liability for negligence which
directly causes loss to innocent third parties. The legal profes-
sion can ill afford the stigmatizing effect of appearing to shield
its members at the expense of those who reasonably rely on
their skills.1' 6
Of course, where the duty is recognized by the courts, it
extends to unknown third persons, as in a devise drafted by an
attorney, for example, "to A (a stranger) for life, remainder to
his surviving children." Such third persons would be reasonably
foreseeable and within a limited class of persons to whom the
attorney would owe a duty. Glanzer clearly is applicable to the
situation of real property devises by will.
X. CONCLUSION
In a world where population is growing rapidly, and contact
and relationships between persons can lead to harm and injury,
the philosophical inquiry is a relatively simple one. Am I my
brother's keeper? Is it up to each of us to avoid causing foresee-
able harm to others? The answer plainly is in the affirmative.
Next, is it important to affix some specific label to this
duty? In some instances, where a plaintiff can waive the tort and
sue in assumpsit, the plaintiff is at liberty to choose the label he
will affix to his particular cause of action." In the real world, as
distinguished from law school, labels are not of earth-shaking
importance.
It is not as important to avoid affixing an incorrect label on
the particular cause of action as it is to recognize the underlying
principle. In case after case, the courts have dealt with a harm in
such terms as misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and negli-
gent misrepresentation. The fact of the matter is that the great
underlying duty is to use due care to avoid foreseeable harm,
and the reporting aspect of the circumstances giving rise to the
196. Note, 17 NEw ENG. 3 (1982); accord., Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060
(D.C. 1983).
197. For example, failure to perform a contract with due care can be treated as a
breach of contract or the tort of negligence. See Wilson v. Palmer, 452 N.E.2d 426 (Ind.
1983).
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duty is of relatively minor importance.
It does not matter where, in the casebook or law course, this
duty is found. Casebook writers disagree and will continue to
disagree as to the proper pigeonhole for many of the matters
discussed herein. Clearly, the duty can be found in a variety of
fact situations spanning many artificial divisions within the law
school curriculum.
Some problems have arisen out of pure and simple owner-
ship of land, and courts have concluded that the duty to avoid
foreseeable harm to others exists. In other land ownership cases
the courts have applied contract principles, as in the building
construction cases; yet the duty has remained the same. In still
other areas, the courts, with equal logic, selected a contract the-
ory (for instance, a third party beneficiary theory), or a tort the-
ory, to deal with the situation wherein a seller was provided with
a faulty abstract. Still, the duty remains unchanged despite
whatever label is initially placed on the claim and without
regard to the label a court attaches to its rationale.
Should limits be placed on the duty? Where limitless liabil-
ity to others might result, most courts have been unwilling to
impose limitless liability. This is an attitude left over from the
days when verdicts were smaller. Today, when an airliner
crashes and the resulting deaths are plainly due to negligence,
the verdicts are destined to be huge. That this is proper is a
lesson we have learned from the torts lawyers. We must consider
whether it is more equitable for an accounting firm to go under,
or for investors who relied on their statements to lose their
investments.
Lastly, the privity notion is simply unsupportable. If the
court is disposed to deny liability, it invokes the doctrine of
privity. This rule is found in its most repulsive form where a
lawyer draws a simple but faulty will and the stranger-devisee is
told he cannot sue because privity is lacking. If the court
chooses to affix liability, it decides that privity is unnecessary.
This shell game belongs in a traveling circus, not in the courts.
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